# Measure

Source:
Upper  table (DH) on p. 31, Annex 4, columns 2 and 4.


Notes:
Calculated by combining Tables II and III of Haruvy and Noussair (2006).


Notes:
AmplitudeHN is equivalent to AmplitudeK, because the fundamental value was constant. The fact that a call auction institution was used is taken from Caginalp, Porter and Smith (2001), p. 82, and was confirmed in private communication by Dave Porter.


Source:
Upper  table (DM) on p. 32, Annex 4, columns 2 and 4.


Notes:
Asset-Cash-Ratio calculated as if loan was normal cash.


Notes:
Measure does not exclude minimum price deviations happening after the maximum price deviation. There is a conflict between the text on p. 17 and formula (2). Lucy Ackert confirmed that the measure is AmplitudeK.


Source:
Upper  table (DL) on p. 33, Annex 4, columns 2 and 4.


Source:
Table 1 p. 1734, rows 19 - 22, columns 7-9.


Source:
Table 1 p. 1734, rows 19 - 22, columns 2-6.


Source:
Table 13.2, p. 187, Table 13.3, p.189 and Table 13.4, p. 192 in each column 5.

Notes:
The amplitude series was divided by 3.6, the intrinsic value of the shares in period 1.


Notes:
The amplitude series was divided by 2.4, the intrinsic value of the shares in period 1.


Source:
Table 2, p. 116. p-values from same source (assumed two-sided).


Notes:
Unclear how many units could be sold short.


Notes:
Only reported from a database of results; some features not really representative of a baseline treatment.


Notes:
Calculated by dividing the mean of the price amplitude (column 2)  by 3.75, the intrinsic value of the share in period 1.


Source:
Table 13.2, p. 187, Table 13.3, p.189 and Table 13.4, p. 192 in each column 6.


Source:
Table A1, p. 31, row 2 and using data from Corgnet et al. (2007).


Source:
Table 4, p. 934. Significance test data stems from Table 5A, p. 935.


Source:
Table A1, p. 31, row 3 and using data from Corgnet et al. (2007).


Notes:
Discrepancies between Appendix Table B1, p. 101, and Table 2, p. 94 in the value for P3. Used raw data in the appendix table.


Source:
Table 2, p. 428, Panel A, column 3, content row 2.


Source:
Table 2, p. 428, Panel A, column 2, content row 2.


Source:
Table 2, p. 428, Panel A, column 4, content row 2.


Notes:
The fact that a call auction institution was used is taken from Caginalp, Porter and Smith (2001), p. 82, and was confirmed in private communication by Dave Porter.


Source:
Ackert et al. (2002), Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper 2002-24, Table 3, p. 30, Panel A, column 3, content row 6.


Source:
Ackert et al. (2002), Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper 2002-24, Table 3, p. 30, Panel A, column 2, content row 6.


Source:
Ackert et al. (2002), Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper 2002-24, Table 3, p. 30, Panel A, column 4, content row 6.


Notes:
The turnover for the Corgnet et al. (2008) two random message treatments was only reported in an aggregated form


Source:
Text on pp. 4-5 and upper  table (DH) on p. 31, Annex 4, column 4.


Source:
Table 13.2, p. 187, Table 13.3, p.189 and Table 13.4, p. 192 in each column 7.


Notes:
Bounded from above by 1 (rescaled by /12*15).


Notes:
See King et al. (1993) - could be a typo (but in original papers)! Unclear how many units could be sold short.


Notes:
AverageBiasHN was calculated by dividing the mean Total Bias by the number of periods (15) and by 100 to transform from ECU to Euro.


Source:
Table A1, p. 31, row 4 and using data from Corgnet et al. (2007).

Notes:
Corgnet et al. (2008) use the mean period transaction price instead of the median in their calculation of AverageDispersion


Notes:
AverageDispersionHN was calculated by dividing the mean Total Dispersion by the number of periods (15).


Source:
Table A1, p. 31, row 5, divided by 100 and using data from Corgnet et al. (2007).


Source:
Table 1 p. 1734, rows 9 - 12, columns 7-9.


Source:
Table 1 p. 1734, rows 9 - 12, columns 2-6.


Source:
Table 13.2, p. 187, Table 13.3, p.189 and Table 13.4, p. 192 in each column 3.


Notes:
Dividends of 20 or 40 create more overpriced transactions compared to 0, 8, 28, or 60.


Notes:
Calculated as e.g. sum price if stock==1 & round==1 & experiment==1 & price>maxdiv. Asset-Cash-Ratio calculated as if loan was normal cash.


Notes:
Calculated as e.g. sum price if stock==1 & round==2 & experiment==1 & price>maxdiv. Asset-Cash-Ratio calculated as if loan was normal cash.


Notes:
Calculated as e.g. sum price if stock==1 & round==3 & experiment==1 & price>maxdiv. Asset-Cash-Ratio calculated as if loan was normal cash.


Notes:
Calculated as e.g. sum price if stock==1 & round==1 & experiment==5 & price>maxdiv. Asset-Cash-Ratio calculated as if loan was normal cash.


Notes:
Calculated as e.g. sum price if stock==1 & round==2 & experiment==5 & price>maxdiv. Asset-Cash-Ratio calculated as if loan was normal cash.


Source:
Table 13.2, p. 187, Table 13.3, p.189 and Table 13.4, p. 192 in each column 4.


Notes:
Visual identification of data, some ambiguity in markets 5 and 6.


Notes:
Visual identification of data, some ambiguity in market 10.


Notes:
Visual identification of data, some ambiguity in market 11.


Notes:
Visual identification of data, some ambiguity in market 7.


Notes:
Visual identification of data, some ambiguity in market 13.


Notes:
Visual identification of data, some ambiguity in market 3. Rescaled from 12 to 15 periods.


Notes:
Visual identification of data, some ambiguity in markets 1 and 2. Rescaled from 12 to 15 periods.


Notes:
Visual identification of data, some ambiguity in markets 1, 2 and 4. Rescaled from 12 to 15 periods.


Notes:
Visual identification of data, some ambiguity in markets 1, 3 and 4. Rescaled from 12 to 15 periods.


Notes:
Visual identification of data, some ambiguity in markets 1 and 4. Rescaled from 12 to 15 periods.


Source:
Text on pp. 4-5 and upper  table (DM) on p. 32, Annex 4, column 4.


Source:
Text on pp. 4-5 and upper  table (DL) on p. 33, Annex 4, column 4.


Source:
Table 1, p. 6  and upper  table (DH) on p. 31, Annex 4, column 3.


Source:
Table 1, p. 6  and upper  table (DM) on p. 32, Annex 4, column 3.


Source:
Table 1, p. 6  and upper  table (DL) on p. 33, Annex 4, column 3.


Source:
Appendix table 4A, p. 32, content row 4, content column 6.


Source:
Appendix table 4A, p. 32, content row 4, content column 12.


Source:
Appendix table 4A, p. 32, content row 3, content column 13.


Source:
Appendix table 4A, p. 32, content row 2, content column 13.


Source:
Appendix table 4A, p. 32, content row 1, content column 13.


Notes:
Some ambiguity in visual identification in markets 2 and 3.


Notes:
Some ambiguity in figures B1 and  B5. Figure B7 assumed to stem from inexperienced session in line with Table 4, p. 519.


Notes:
Some ambiguity in figures B2, B7 and B8. Figure B7 assumed to stem from inexperienced session in line with Table 4, p. 519.


Notes:
Some ambiguity in figures B1 and B5. Figure B7 assumed to stem from inexperienced session in line with Table 4, p. 519.


Source:
Markets 5, 7 and 17 from Figures 2, 3, and 5, pp. 1127, 1129 and 1130.


Source:
Markets 6x, 9x and 19x from Figures 2, 3 and 4, pp. 1127 and 1129.


Source:
Markets 16 and 18 from Figures 4 and 8, pp. 1129 and 1131.


Source:
Markets 25x and 28x from Figure 7 and 9, pp. 1131 and 1132.

Notes:
Some ambiguity in market 28x. Subjects of market 25x gained their experience in market 23, which had price controls.


Notes:
Subjects of market 25x gained their experience in market 23, which had price controls.


Notes:
Period 12 in the second market lasted only 120 seconds.


Notes:
Sample size is assuming non-standard policy markets are not included in bubble measures.


Notes:
Market 8 included (see 2nd paragraph, p. 7).


Notes:
Market 8 included (see 2nd paragraph, p. 7). Measure is calculated as sum (qt * abs(pt-ft))/TSU. Exclude for other reason: Since pt is the mean price in period t, this differs from usual calculation of this measure.


Notes:
Market 8 included (see 2nd paragraph, p. 7). Divided by 15 to transform Total Dispersion to AverageDispersionHN.


Source:
Table 2, p. 428, Panel B, column 2, content row 2.


Source:
Table 2, p. 428, Panel B, column 3, content row 2.


Source:
Table 2, p. 428, Panel B, column 4, content row 2.


Source:
Ackert et al. (2002), Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper 2002-24, Table 3, p. 30, Panel B, column 2, content row 6.


Source:
Ackert et al. (2002), Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper 2002-24, Table 3, p. 30, Panel B, column 3, content row 6.


Source:
Ackert et al. (2002), Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper 2002-24, Table 3, p. 30, Panel B, column 4, content row 6.


Notes:
Visual identification of data, some ambiguity in market 1. Rescaled from 12 to 15 periods.


Notes:
Visual identification of data, some ambiguity in markets 2 and 3. Rescaled from 12 to 15 periods.


Notes:
Visual identification of data, some ambiguity in all markets. Rescaled from 12 to 15 periods.


Source:
Upper  table (DH) on p. 31, Annex 4, column 4.


Source:
Upper  table (DM) on p. 32, Annex 4, column 4.


Source:
Upper  table (DL) on p. 33, Annex 4, column 4.


Source:
Lower  table (IHA) on p. 31, both tables (IHB, IHC) p. 34, and upper  table (IHZ) on p. 38, Annex 4 and 5, columns 2 and 4.


Source:
Lower  table (IM) on p. 32, Annex 4, columns 2 and 4.


Source:
Lower  table (ILA) on p. 33, both tables (ILB, ILC) p. 35, Annex 4, columns 2 and 4.


Source:
Text on pp. 4-5 and lower  table (IHA) on p. 31, both tables (IHB, IHC) p. 34, and upper  table (IHZ) on p. 38, Annex 4 and 5,  column 4.


Source:
Text on pp. 4-5 and lower  table (IM) on p. 32, Annex 4, column 4.


Source:
Text on pp. 4-5 and lower  table (ILA) on p. 33, both tables (ILB, ILC) p. 35, Annex 4, column 4.


Source:
Table 1, p. 6  and lower  table (IHA) on p. 31, both tables (IHB, ICH) p. 34, and upper  table (IHZ) on p. 38, Annex 4 and 5, column 3.


Source:
Table 1, p. 6  and lower  table (IM) on p. 32, Annex 4, column 3.


Source:
Table 1, p. 6  and lower  table (ILA) on p. 33, both tables (ILB, ILC) p. 35, Annex 4, column 3.


Source:
Lower  table (IHA) on p. 31, both tables (IHB, IHC) p. 34, and upper  table (IHZ) on p. 38, Annex 4 and 5, column 4.


Source:
Lower  table (IM) on p. 32, Annex 4, column 4.


Source:
Lower  table (ILA) on p. 33, both tables (ILB, ILC) p. 35, Annex 4, column 4.


Notes:
The asset-to-cash-ratio is calculated only over buyers' cash and sellers' stocks - the rest of the endowments is just to equalize endowment value over trader type and plays no role in transactions.


Notes:
Some ambiguity in visual identification.


Source:
Private correspondence with Brice Corgnet, September 1, 2010.


Notes:
Pooled with data from random low treatment, inexperienced.


Notes:
Discrepancies between Appendix Table B1, p. 101, and Table 2, p. 94 in the value for G1. Used raw data in the appendix table.


Notes:
Unclear whether mean or median prices are plotted, therefore assumed to be substituted.


Notes:
The asset-to-cash-ratio is calculated only over buyers' cash and sellers' stocks - the rest of the endowments is just to equalize endowment value over trader type and plays no role in transactions.
Turnover in the "No speculation" treatment cannot be compared to that from other treatments, since no share can be transacted  more than once.


Notes:
The asset-to-cash-ratio is calculated only over buyers' cash and sellers' stocks - the rest of the endowments is just to equalize endowment value over trader type and plays no role in transactions.
DeviationKSWV in the "No speculation" treatment cannot be compared to that from other treatments, since no share can be transacted  more than once.


Notes:
Calculated as sample standard deviation of call market period prices divided by population standard deviation of period fundamental values.


Notes:
Market 8 included (see Schoenberg 2008, 2nd paragraph, p. 7).


Source:
Schoenberg 2008, Table 1, p. 6, row 2, column 3.


Source:
Schoenberg 2008, Table 1, p. 6, row 2, column 4.


Source:
Schoenberg 2008, Table 1, p. 6, row 3, column 3.


Source:
Schoenberg 2008, Table 1, p. 6, row 3, column 4.


Source:
Schoenberg 2008, Table 1, p. 6, row 7, column 3.


Source:
Schoenberg 2008, Table 1, p. 6, row 7, column 4.


Source:
Schoenberg 2008, Table 1, p. 6, row 8, column 3.


Source:
Schoenberg 2008, Table 1, p. 6, row 8, column 4.


Notes:
Rescaled to account for changing total stock of units.


Notes:
Experience = 0 because first round with only 2/3 twice+ experienced traders.


Notes:
Experience = 0 because first round with inflow of new traders.


Notes:
Experience = 1 because second round with inflow of new traders.


Notes:
Experience = 2 because third round with inflow of new traders.


Source:
Table 5, p. 37 and Table 8, p. 40 in press version.


Source:
Table 1, p. 31 and Table 2, p. 32 pre-press version.


# MeasureParameters

Comment:
In the calculation of this measure, the average price was used instead of the median (or vice versa).


Parameter:
SUR instead of plain vanilla calculation

Comment:
Measure is the result of a seemingly unrelated regression instead of straightforward calculation.


Comment:
Measure should be excluded from aggregation due to unspecified problems with comparability.


Comment:
Measure based on more than one treatment variation compared to baseline case. Filled automatically for every measure which fulfills the criteria.


Comment:
Switch for manual exclusion of some records.


Comment:
This measure has no special parameter. Filled automatically for every measure which does not have another parameter assigned to it.


Comment:
Some data had to be identified visually from figures provided in the paper before being used in the bubble measure calculation.


Comment:
Some measure had to be rescaled to take account of, e.g. 12 instead of 15 periods (see Notes for details).


Comment:
Paper is a working paper. Filled automatically to equal the corresponding entry in the Studies table.


Comment:
The study this measure stems from is obsolete. Filled automatically to equal the corresponding entry in the Studies table.


Comment:
The scale of this measure cannot be compared to other measures.


# MeasureTypes

NecessaryInfo:
median(Pt), ft OR median(Pt)-ft POSSIBLY avg(Pt) instead of median(Pt)


NecessaryInfo:
median(Pt), ft OR median(Pt)-ft, POSSIBLY avg(Pt) instead of median(Pt)


NecessaryInfo:
avg(Pt), ft OR avg(Pt)-ft OR max/min(avg(Pt)-ft)


NecessaryInfo:
^sigma(Pit), sigma(ft) OR ^sigma(Pit), ft


# Studies

Title:
The Effect of Short Selling on Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Spot Asset Markets


Journal:
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

Title:
Initial cash/asset ratio and asset prices: An experimental study


Title:
Traders’ Expectations in Asset Markets: Experimental Evidence


Title:
Price Bubbles in Laboratory Asset Markets with Constant Fundamental Values


Journal:
Journal of Psychology and Financial Markets

Title:
The Effects of Subject Pool and Design Experience on Rationality in Experimental Asset Markets


Title:
Private Information Acquisition in Experimental Markets Prone to Bubble and Crash


Title:
The Robustness of Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Stock Markets


Title:
Futures Markets and Bubble Formation in Experimental Asset Markets


Title:
Futures Contracting and Dividend Uncertainty in Experimental Asset Markets


Title:
Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets


Title:
Dividend timing and behavior in laboratory asset markets


Title:
Price bubbles and crashes in experimental call markets


Journal:
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Title:
Efficiency and Adaptive Expectations in Experimental Asset and Digital Option Markets


Comment:
Asset-Cash-Ratio calculated over the value of both asset types to cash.

Title:
Margin, Short Selling, and Lotteries in Experimental Asset Markets


Title:
Asset Trading Behavior Under Reliable and Unreliable Public Statements


Title:
Thar She Blows: Can Bubbles Be Rekindled with Experienced Subjects?


Title:
Nonspeculative Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets: Lack of Common Knowledge of Rationality vs. Actual Irrationality


Title:
Peaks and Valleys: Experimental Asset Markets with Non-Monotonic Fundamentals


Title:
Two Heads are Less Bubbly than One: Team Decision-Making in an Experimental Asset Market


Title:
Financial Bubbles: Excess Cash, Momentum, and Incomplete Information


Title:
The impact of asset repurchases and issues in an experimental market


Title:
Asset Bubbles and Rationality: Additional Evidence from Capital Gains Tax Experiments


Comment:
The normal deviation measure was not included since while it resembles AverageDispersionHN, it employs the mean instead of the median period price and the correct way to deal with the interest rate to correspond with AverageDispersionHN's zero interest rate is unclear.

Title:
Soft landing of a stock market bubble. An experimental study.


Title:
Market Efficiency: Evidence from a No-Bubble Asset Market Experiment


Title:
An Experimental Study of Bubble Formation in Asset Markets Using the Tâtonnement Pricing Mechanism


Comment:
Dividends = {0,8,28,60}, n=131, 8-10 subjects per market, total endowment of 13.05, payout final holdings plus $5 show-up fee.

Title:
Relative Wealth Concerns and Asset Bubbles: An Experimental Approach


Title:
To See is to Believe - Common Expectations of Rationality in Experimental Asset Markets


Comment:
Unused because n=1 and analysis is not overly sophisticated.
An experimental illustration *

Title:
Silly bubbles and the insensitivity of rationality testing: An experimental illustration


Comment:
Unused because treatments deviate too widely from SSW baseline.

Title:
Price bubbles sans dividend anchors: Evidence from laboratory stock markets


Title:
The Institutional Nature of Price Bubbles


Comment:
Unused because unclear which measures are reported for the first time.

Title:
Bubble measures in experimental asset markets


Title:
Peaks and valleys - Price discovery in experimental asset markets with non-monotonic fundamentals


Journal:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Title:
The effect of reliability, content and timing of public announcements on asset trading behavior


Comment:
Not included in the database, since all analyses are performed only on those markets that did warrant a policy intervention, implying that they exhibited bubbles over the first three periods. This exclusion of all non-bubbling markets biases the results.


Title:
Overconfidence and Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets


Journal:
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

Title:
Probability Judgment Error and Speculation in Laboratory Asset Market Bubbles


Title:
Relative Wealth Concerns in Asset Markets: An Experimental Approach


Title:
The impact of instructions and procedure on reducing confusion and bubbles in experimental asset markets


Title:
Thar She Bursts - Reducing Confusion Reduces Bubbles


Title:
League-Table Incentives and Price Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets


Title:
Bubbles and Experience: An Experiment with a Steady Inflow of New Traders


Title:
Excitement and Irrationality in a Financial Market


Title:
Eliminating Laboratory Asset Bubbles by Paying Interest on Cash


Title:
Price Bubbles in Asset Market Experiments with a Flat Fundamental Value


Title:
Irrationality and beliefs in laboratory asset markets: ist it me or is it you?


Title:
The Effect of Induced Mood on Prices in Asset Markets - Experimental Evidence


Title:
Bubbles and Incentives: An Experiment on Asset Markets


Title:
Relative performance information in asset markets: An
experimental approach


Title:
Rate-of-return Parity in Experimental Asset Markets


Title:
Can Concentration Control Policies Eliminate Bubbles?


# Treatments

Hypothesis:
Rational expectations equilibrium causes trading at fundamental values


Description:
Traders may be short up to n shares of the experimental asset

Hypothesis:
Traders can leverage sales and counter price run-ups


Description:
Security pays a single dividend at the end of the trading horizon

Hypothesis:
Dividend concentration focuses attention on longer-term income stream


Hypothesis:
Less public information decreases bubbles by decreasing speculation


Description:
Traders may be short up to n shares of the experimental asset, initial cash balance m times as great


Description:
Traders may be short up to a value equivalent to x% of their cash reserve


Treatment:
Short selling 100% cash reserve, cash x10

Description:
Traders may be short up to a value equivalent to x% of their cash reserve, initial cash balance m times as great


Description:
Traders may be short up to a value equivalent to 100% (200%) of their cash reserve if last transaction price was above (below) fundamental value


Description:
Security has a terminal value and, becaue of a negative expected dividend or high interest on cash, has an increasing fundamental value

Hypothesis:
Increasing fundamental value leads to bubble amelioration


Description:
Security pays a fixed and known dividend amount

Hypothesis:
Trading based on dividend risk preference is eliminated


Description:
Dividend level different across investors

Hypothesis:
Heterogeneous dividends increase propensity to trade and permit measurement of allocational efficiency


Description:
Security pays a dividend with a mean of zero at the end of each period

Hypothesis:
Constant fundamental value decreases bubbles due to simplified convergence process


Description:
Half of all traders are (mainly) twice experienced business majors, half are inexperienced arts and sciences students

Hypothesis:
Business and economics education improves market efficiency


Description:
Half of all traders are inexperienced business majors, half are (mainly) twice experienced arts and sciences students


Description:
Traders are freshman arts and sciences students


Description:
1/3 of the traders are at least twice experienced, 2/3 are inexperienced

Hypothesis:
Small fraction of experienced traders prevents bubble


Description:
2/3 of the traders are at least twice experienced, 1/3 are inexperienced

Hypothesis:
Large fraction of experienced traders prevents bubble


Description:
Traders can buy information about dividend values in each period of a five-period sequence, delivered at the beginning of each period

Hypothesis:
Private information reinforces common expectations and weakens reliance on information in prices


Description:
Traders can buy information about dividend values in each period of a five-period sequence, delivered at the beginning of the sequence


Description:
Buyer and seller in a transaction pay 10 cents each for a trade

Hypothesis:
Fewer transactions due to cost of trading


Description:
Homogeneous initial amounts of cash and shares over all traders

Hypothesis:
Traders do not need to balance portfolios


Description:
Informed traders have read {Smith 1988 #91} and are given information on bids, offers and excess bids

Hypothesis:
Informed traders aware of bubble characteristics eliminate bubble


Description:
Asset price can only change by a limited amount from the previous period closing price

Hypothesis:
Suppressed expectation of rapid price changes reduces price volatility


Description:
Traders are given an interest-free loan to be paid back by the last period

Hypothesis:
Purchases can be leveraged to raise prices that are below dividend value


Description:
Futures markets for each period, opening in reverse order of maturity

Hypothesis:
Opening futures markets from future backwards aids subjects’ backward induction


Description:
Agents can trade a mid-horizon (period 8) security in advance

Hypothesis:
Futures contracts should hasten the formation of common expectations


Description:
Five-point discrete dividend distribution with symmetric probabilities

Hypothesis:
Symmetric dividend focuses attention on expected value


Description:
Subjects can trade in digital options market maturing in period 8

Hypothesis:
Digital option contracts should hasten the formation of common expectations


Description:
Subjects can trade in digital options market maturing in periods 5, 10, and 15


Description:
Security pays dividends at the end of each period and an additional dividend at the end of the trading horizon


Description:
Measure is for an asset with a high dividend with low probability, which accompanies the standard market

Hypothesis:
Lottery assets exhibit higher extent and frequency of bubbles


Description:
Traders are either buyers or sellers, but never both

Hypothesis:
Impossibility of reaping capital gains prevents speculative bubble


Description:
Traders trained in two sessions of dividend certainty, then subjected to third session of baseline design

Hypothesis:
Dividend uncertainty causes bubble with subjects twice experienced in dividend certainty treatment


Description:
Trade in a service market in addition to asset market

Hypothesis:
Second trading outlet reduces price inefficiencies due to Active Participation Hypothesis (the APH is defined in {Lei 2001 #75})


Description:
Traders experience a time of rising, followed by a time of falling fundamental values


Description:
Traders twice experienced in Baseline design are faced with Dividend spread high parameterization and large cash endowment

Hypothesis:
Shock in market parameters rekindles bubble even with experienced subjects


Description:
Traders experience a time of falling, followed by a time of rising fundamental values


Description:
Uninformative announcement telling subjects that “The price is too high”, chosen by experimenter prior to session

Hypothesis:
Uninformative communication influences bubble characteristics; experimenter choice prior to session conveys medium reliability


Description:
Uninformative announcement telling subjects that “The price is too low”, chosen by experimenter prior to session


Description:
Uninformative announcement telling subjects that “The price is too high”; randomly chosen prior to session

Hypothesis:
Uninformative communication influences bubble characteristics ; random choice prior to session conveys low reliability


Description:
Uninformative announcement telling subjects that “The price is too low”; randomly chosen prior to session


Description:
Uninformative announcement telling subjects that “The price is too high/low”; announcement is always true, conditional on previous period’s price

Hypothesis:
Informative communication influences bubble characteristics; conditional choice based on actual prices conveys high reliability


Description:
Security pays a period-end dividend of {0,1,8,28,98} with equal probability

Hypothesis:
Higher dividend variability compared to Baseline treatment increases bubble extent


Description:
Each decision-making unit consists of two subjects working together on one PC

Hypothesis:
Team discussion corrects errors in decision-making and reduces risk-loving behavior


Description:
Subjects are entitled to a dividend, but payout is deferred until the end of the experimental round

Hypothesis:
Deferred dividend payment reduces liquidity, thereby deflating transaction prices


Description:
All orders are visible to all participants


Description:
Tax of 50% levied on all intra-period changes in cash


Description:
Market interest on investments in risk-less bond, increases when market overheats

Hypothesis:
Opportunity cost of investment in interest bearing bond lowers asset price


Description:
Market interest rate of 5% on investments in risk-less bond


Description:
Pre-market phase with dividend payouts but no trade and control questions before market phase

Hypothesis:
Experience of dividend process improves understanding


Description:
Two-point discrete dividend distribution with symmetric probabilities


Hypothesis:
Demand/supply discovery during tâtonnement reduces price deviation from fundamentals


Description:
Public information on highest wealth of any subject

Hypothesis:
Social comparison impacts bubble characteristics


Description:
Public information on lowest wealth of any subject


Description:
Traders predicted the next period's closing price or mean transaction price

Hypothesis:
Traders' expectations influence market prices


Description:
Market transactions are conducted orally


Description:
Three-point discrete dividend distribution with symmetric probabilities


Description:
Subjects are unsure how many of the subjects in their market answered extended control questions

Hypothesis:
Common knowledge of rationality, induced by extended control questions, induces fundamental value trading


Description:
Subjects have to answer a question about the asset's dividend holding value for every period and the buying and selling frame.

Hypothesis:
Extended control questions induce common knowledge of rationality and fundamental value trading


Description:
Informed traders who can short sel up to 4 shares have read {Smith 1988 #91} and are given information on bids, offers and excess bids


Hypothesis:
Research question: Efficiency of the exchange rate


Description:
Subjects obtained high scores on overconfidence test.


Description:
Subjects obtained low scores on overconfidence test


Description:
Asset with highly skewed, truncated value distribution

Hypothesis:
Subjects exhibit probability judgment error compared to untruncated asset


Description:
Asset with highly skewed, untruncated value distribution

Hypothesis:
Subjects exhibit probability judgment error compared to truncated asset


Description:
100% (0%) of all subjects get private information on highest (lowest) wealth of any subject


Description:
67% (33%) of all subjects get private information on highest (lowest) wealth of any subject


Description:
33% (67%) of all subjects get private information on highest (lowest) wealth of any subject


Description:
0% (100%) of all subjects get private information on highest (lowest) wealth of any subject


Description:
In the instructions, the fundamental value is illustrated by a graph instead of a table

Hypothesis:
Reducing subject confusion about the fundamental value reduces bubbles


Description:
Subjects have to forecast the period's fundamental value at the beginning of every period


Description:
Subjects receive cash inflows to offset changes in the cash-asset ratio

Hypothesis:
Cash-asset ratio is responsible for bubble phenomenon


Description:
Subjects suffer cash outflows to offset changes in the cash-asset ratio


Description:
Asset is framed as a "depletable gold mine"


Description:
Traders receive equal periodic cash and asset inflows.


Description:
Traders receive periodic cash and asset inflows depending on their relative performance.


Description:
Inflow of inexperienced traders every period, amounting to 1/3 of all traders


Description:
Inflow of inexperienced traders every period, amounting to 2/3 of all traders


Description:
Elicitation of excitement, anger, anxiety and joy at the beginning of every period

Hypothesis:
Mispricing is affected by subjects' emotional state


Description:
Subjects can freely converse via electronic chat while trading


Description:
Market interest rate of 10% on cash holdings

Hypothesis:
Opportunity cost of holding cash lowers asset price


Description:
Market interest rate of 15% on cash holdings


Description:
Market interest rate of 20% on cash holdings


Description:
Subject compensation is based not on terminal wealth but on changes in wealth from the starting endowment


Description:
The three subjects with the highest profit receive extra cash after a period


Description:
The three subjects with the highest profit receive extra cash after a market


Description:
Subjects watch exciting and upbeat video prior to trading.


Description:
Subjects watch scary video prior to trading.


Description:
Subjects watch sad video prior to trading.


Description:
Subjects watch randomly assigned exciting and upbeat or neutral video prior to trading.


Description:
Subjects watch neutral video prior to trading.


Description:
Subjects watch positive (funny) video prior to trading.


Description:
Each of two different assets can only be traded in its specific currency.

Hypothesis:
Rate-of-return parity can only be tested with different currencies.


Description:
50% of all shares are repurchased by the experimenter in period 6.


Description:
New shares amounting to 50% of the total stock of units are sold to the market by the experimenter in period 6.


Description:
Cap on subjects' share holdings amounting to 1.8 times the initial endowment enforced over entire experiment

Hypothesis:
Limiting concentration decreases bubbles by limiting momentum trading.


Description:
Cap on subjects' share holdings amounting to 1.8 times the initial endowment enforced over the first half of the experiment


