Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

Using fourteen years of time use data collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Study 1 examines the relationship between income and the time spent socializing with work colleagues off the job for hourly paid workers (vs non-hourly paid workers). Study 2 conceptually replicates the results of the archival study and provided more direct causal evidence for the mechanism of economic evaluation through the process of random assignment.

Data sets for all three studies in the paper and R code for the analyses of Study 1 and 2.

The current research examines negotiators’ deception behaviors towards unfamiliar counterparts with varying creditable reputations– specifically, proficient, friendly, and honest reputations. We primarily differentiate between the honest and friendly reputations, which are both seemingly cooperative, and often tangled in the negotiation literature. We generally hypothesized that Negotiators would deceive counterparts with honest reputations less than those with friendly (or proficient) reputations and that the attenuated deception towards counterparts with honest versus friendly (or proficient) reputations would disappear (or even backfire) in the face of in-congruency – that is, in face of counterparts' deceptive conduct. We also gained further insight into the underlying mechanisms and boundary conditions. Data was extracted from "Qualtrics". It includes raw data from our negotiation sessions (reported in Studies 1 to 4) including three preliminary studies (A, B, and C). Please note that in Studies 2 and 4, we also had a prior phase - reported in the manuscript as phase 1, which measured various individual differences, including participants' dispositional lying tendencies. Study 2 and Study 4's data files contain the main session variables (Phase 2) plus the individual differences measures collected in Phase 1 (for the same participant). The actual chat sessions (conducted via "chatplat" in Study 4) are also attached in a txt file extracted from "chatplat" platform, and are in Hebrew. SPSS data files are attached (for each Study). We added a label for each variable for further clarifications. We also attached SPSS syntax files. These files include comments demonstrating the exact filter condition (Data-> Select Cases) used before any analyses were conducted. We further report the specific SPSS analyses conducted and reported in the manuscript.

Relative Deprivation

Data for Study 2

This visual abstract is a graphical and layman summary of the journal article The impact of concession patterns on negotiations: When and why decreasing concessions lead to a distributive disadvantage, published in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 165 in 2021. We propose that making a series of decreasing concessions (e.g., $1,500–1,210–1,180–1,170) signals that negotiators are reaching their limit and that this results in a negotiation disadvantage for offer recipients. Although we find that most negotiators do not use this strategy naturally, seven studies (N = 2,311) demonstrate that decreasing concessions causes recipients to make less ambitious counteroffers (Studies 1–5) and reach worse deals (Study 2) in distributive negotiations. We find that this disadvantage occurs because decreasing concessions shape recipients’ expectations of the subsequent offers that will be made, which results in inflated perceptions of the counterparts’ reservation price relative to the other concession strategies (Study 3). In addition, we find that this disadvantage is particularly large when concessions decrease at a moderate rate (Study 4a) and when decreasing concessions takes place over more (vs. fewer) rounds (Study 4b). Finally, we find that recipients can protect themselves against the deleterious effects of decreasing concession by thinking of a target before they enter the negotiation (Study 5). Acknowledgement This visual abstract was created with contributions from Tay Mui Yen, Dong Danping, and Aaron Tay from SMU Libraries

This visual abstract is a graphical and layman summary of the journal article The impact of concession patterns on negotiations: When and why decreasing concessions lead to a distributive disadvantage, published in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 165 in 2021. We propose that making a series of decreasing concessions (e.g., $1,500–1,210–1,180–1,170) signals that negotiators are reaching their limit and that this results in a negotiation disadvantage for offer recipients. Although we find that most negotiators do not use this strategy naturally, seven studies (N = 2,311) demonstrate that decreasing concessions causes recipients to make less ambitious counteroffers (Studies 1–5) and reach worse deals (Study 2) in distributive negotiations. We find that this disadvantage occurs because decreasing concessions shape recipients’ expectations of the subsequent offers that will be made, which results in inflated perceptions of the counterparts’ reservation price relative to the other concession strategies (Study 3). In addition, we find that this disadvantage is particularly large when concessions decrease at a moderate rate (Study 4a) and when decreasing concessions takes place over more (vs. fewer) rounds (Study 4b). Finally, we find that recipients can protect themselves against the deleterious effects of decreasing concession by thinking of a target before they enter the negotiation (Study 5). Acknowledgement This visual abstract was created with contributions from Tay Mui Yen, Dong Danping, and Aaron Tay from SMU Libraries