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Replication files for "Disasters and Elections: Estimating the Net Effect of Damage and Relief in Historical Perspective," by Boris Heersink, Brenton D. Peterson, and Jeffery A. Jenkins.
Data Types:
  • Software/Code
  • Tabular Data
  • Text
We show that unexpected financial windfalls increase corruption in local government. Our analysis uses a new data set on flood-related transfers, and the associated spending infringements, which the Bulgarian central government distributed to municipalities following torrential rains in 2004 and 2005. Using information from the publicly available audit reports, we are able to build a unique objective index of corruption. We also exploit the quasi-random nature of the rainfall shock (conditional on controls for ground flood risk) to isolate exogenous variation in the amount of funds received by each municipality.
Data Types:
  • Software/Code
  • Tabular Data
AQI air quality observations from ground monitoring stations in China are collected and stored PostGresql (three times each day). The AQI values are coded to Locations which have mappable x, y coordinates in a seperate cumulative locations table.
Data Types:
  • Tabular Data
  • Document
  • Text
The hourly updates of ground monitoring observations in China are collected and stored in .csv files (one for each hour). NOTE: the pm25s data does NOT report locations for the reporting stations in x, y coordinates.
Data Types:
  • Text
  • File Set
The hourly updates of ground monitoring observations in China are collected and stored in .csv files (one for each hour). NOTE: the pm25s data does NOT report locations for the reporting stations in x, y coordinates.
Data Types:
  • Text
  • File Set
I provide code for usage in R, to reproduce all tables, figures, and key findings in the working paper. The data is available in .csv form, and can be imported and analyzed in other statistical software programs. Please email me at errschmi@indiana.edu for any questions or clarifications.
Data Types:
  • Software/Code
  • Tabular Data
We argue that political scientists can provide additional evidence for the predictive validity of observational and quasi-experimental research designs by minimizing the expected prediction error or generalization error of their empirical models. For observational and quasi-experimental data not generated by a stochastic mechanism under the researcher's control, the reproduction of statistical analyses is possible but replication of the data generating procedures is not. Estimating the generalization error of a model for this type of data and then adjusting the model to minimize this estimate --- regularization --- provides evidence for the predictive validity of the study by decreasing the risk of overfitting. Estimating generalization error also allows for model comparisons that highlight underfitting: when a model generalizes poorly due to missing systematic features of the data generating process. Thus, minimizing generalization error provides a principled method for modeling relationships between variables that are measured but whose relationships with the outcome(s) are left unspecified by a deductively valid theory. Overall, the minimization of generalization error is important because it quantifies the expected reliability of predictions in a way that is similar to external validity, consequently increasing the validity of the study's conclusions.
Data Types:
  • Software/Code
  • Text
Data and code for: Petrovsky, Nicolai and Claudia N. Avellaneda. 2014. "Mayoral Public Sector Work Experience and Tax Collection Performance in Colombian Local Governments." International Public Management Journal 17 (2): 145-173.
Data Types:
  • Software/Code
  • Tabular Data
Data and code for: Profiroiu, Marius Constantin, Nicolai Petrovsky, and Edward T. Jennings. 2012. "Does Pendleton's Premise Hold in New And Old Democracies Alike? Politicization and Performance in the U.S. and Central and Eastern Europe. Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences 37 (October): 143-154.
Data Types:
  • Software/Code
  • Tabular Data
The legislative agenda in most parliamentary systems is controlled tightly by the government and bills offered by individual members of parliament have low rates of success. Yet, MPs do seek to present (private) members’ bills even where the rate of adoption is very low. We argue that members’ bills serve as an electoral connection but also as an opportunity for MPs to signal competence to their co-partisans. To demonstrate the presence of an electoral connection we take advantage of the random selection of private members’ bills in the New Zealand House of Representatives and show that survey respondents approve more of electorate MPs whose bills were drawn on the ballot. In addition, we show that MPs respond to the incentives created by the voters and parties’ willingness to reward legislative effort and, consequently, that electorally vulnerable legislators are more likely to place members’ bills on the ballot.
Data Types:
  • Other
  • Software/Code
  • Tabular Data
  • Document
  • Text
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