Data Availability for International Journal of Logistics Research and Application

Published: 16 November 2021| Version 1 | DOI: 10.17632/2m8d26k454.1
Chunyi Ji


Suppose a manufacturing and logistics industry linkage system is composed of logistics outsourcing enterprise groups and logistics contracting enterprise groups in the market. The cooperation between the two parties is established on the principal-agent relationship to obtain the excess profits of the linkage. Due to the information asymmetry, the logistics contracting company fully understands its service capabilities, service costs, and other private information, whereas the logistics outsourcing company can only observe the after-event results and cannot accurately understand the real information of the agent. Logistics contracting companies are willing to share information and reduce logistics risk costs to increase the benefits of linkage cooperation. However, considering the serious homogeneity of services in the logistics outsourcing market, fierce market competition, and low service profits, some logistics contracting companies will choose to speculate instead of sharing their real information, and obtain more cooperation opportunities and seek more speculative gains by overstating their logistics service capabilities and service efforts. The speculative behavior of logistics contracting enterprises will reduce the logistics services, damage the interests of logistics contracting enterprises, and create agency risks. Simultaneously, due to the incompleteness of the outsourcing contract, there is uncertainty in the distribution of excess gains from the linkage. Suppose the logistics contracting company is willing to share the excess profits of the linkage with the logistics contracting company in an incentive manner. In that case, it can induce the logistics contracting company to increase the willingness to cooperate actively, thereby improving the level of logistics services. However, some logistics contracting companies pay too much attention to immediate benefits and are unwilling to motive logistics contracting companies, resulting in insufficient returns for logistics contracting companies, thus enhancing the speculative tendency of logistics contracting companies and creating incentive issues. Therefore, in the manufacturing and logistics industry linkage system, the game strategy of the logistics outsourcing company is incentive and no incentive. The linkage system between the manufacturing industry and the logistics industry is formed through its evolution. Logistics outsourcing companies and logistics contracting companies choose and adjust their respective strategies according to each other's strategic choices, considering their relative adaptability in the group. We set model symbols and descriptions, then make evolutionary game analysis. We get the equilibrium points shown in table 1, the evolutionary stable strategies in table 2. The game payoff matrix under the reward and punishment mechanism is shown in table 3. We make assumption of the value of each parameter to finish the numerical simulation.



Evolutionary Game Theory