Data for: Oil, governance and the (mis)allocation of talent in developing countries

Published: 9 Dec 2016 | Version 1 | DOI: 10.17632/35jrj6t36h.1

Description of this data

Abstract of associated article: This paper sheds light on the relationship between oil rent and the allocation of talent, toward rent-seeking versus more productive activities, conditional on the quality of institutions. Using a sample of 69 developing countries, we demonstrate that oil resources orient university students toward specializations that provide better future access to rents when institutions are weak. The results are robust to various specifications, datasets on governance quality and estimation methods. Oil affects the demand for each profession through a technological effect, indicating complementarity between oil and engineering, manufacturing and construction; however, it also increases the ‘size of the cake’. Therefore, when institutions are weak, oil increases the incentive to opt for professions with better access to rents (law, business, and the social sciences), rather than careers in engineering, creating a deviation from the optimal allocation between the two types of specialization.

Experiment data files

This data is associated with the following publication:

Oil, governance and the (mis)allocation of talent in developing countries

Published in: Journal of Development Economics

Latest version

  • Version 1


    Published: 2016-12-09

    DOI: 10.17632/35jrj6t36h.1

    Cite this dataset

    Omgba, Luc Désiré (2016), “Data for: Oil, governance and the (mis)allocation of talent in developing countries ”, Mendeley Data, v1


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Economics, Macroeconomics


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