genderbribery
Description
Stata File on Experimental Data on the Paper “Men are the Better Corrupt Friends – The Role of Gender Differences and Social Ties in Bribery” Abstract: “This paper investigates the interplay of gender, social ties, and negative externalities in bribery using a laboratory experiment. In a modified dictator game with third-party interventions, men more often engage in bribery than women, particularly when they have social ties with the briber. Conversely, women more often accept bribes but not reciprocate in cases with high externalities. In cases of low negative externalities, no gender differences in bribery exist. The findings suggest that women prioritize fairness considerations, while men place greater emphasis on reciprocity toward the briber when they have social ties.” The experimental procedure involves two stages. Firstly, subjects are randomly assigned to two respective groups following the procedure by Chen and Li, 2009. Secondly, participants play a modified dictator game with a third-party player. Subjects are either assigned to the role of the dictator (or the victim) or the third party and are equally endowed with 6€. The experimental design includes two treatments in a between-subjects design, which varies the relative closeness between the third party and the dictator/victim. In "TP-dictator" the third party and the dictator belong to the same group, while the victim belongs to the outgroup. In "TP-victim" the third party and the victim belong to the same group, while the dictator belongs to the outgroup. The players make the following decisions. The dictator makes three decisions: (1) whether to take money (zero, 2€ or 4€) from an outgroup player, i.e., the “victim”; (2) whether to bribe an ingroup third party (with an amount between zero and 6€, in 50 Cents increments); (3) whether to bribe an outgroup third party (with an amount between zero and 6€, in 50 Cents increments). Decisions (2) and (3) are implemented conditional on the group identity of the third party to elicit strategic considerations in bribery by the dictator. That is, the dictator is asked how much to offer in the case of being matched with an ingroup and in the case being matched with an outgroup third party. On the contrary, the third-party player is informed about the group memberships of the respective players, i.e., the dictator and the victim. The third party makes three decisions: (1) whether to accept or reject the bribe; (2) whether to report the dictator in the case of taking 2€; (3) whether to report the dictator in the case of taking 4€. Decisions (2) and (3) are elicited by means of the strategy method and are independently of decision (1). If the dictator has taken 2€ or 4€ and the third party has decided to report the respective decision, the amount taken by the dictator is returned to the victim. If the third party has decided to accept the bribe, the dictator keeps the bribe, even if they has decided to report the briber.
Files
Steps to reproduce
The experiment was conducted using ztree. Code is available upon request.