Control Defense, Board Structure and Corporate Governance Efficiency under Dual-Class Share Structure——For Chinese Science, Technology, and Innovation-oriented Companies Listed in the United States
Description
The data set includes information on the core variables necessary to examine the relationship between control defense, board structure, and corporate governance efficiency. The study sample is primarily composed of Chinese science, technology, and innovation-oriented companies listed in the United States from 2013 to 2022. Furthermore, it empirically investigates the intrinsic path of the founder control defense on the corporate governance efficiency with a panel data model, with board structure as the moderating role under a dual-class share structure. Moreover, it reveals the roles of equity checks and balances and audit tenure in the governance mechanism of science-technology and innovation-oriented listed companies. The paper finds that: (i) The dual-class share structure serves as an effective mechanism to cope with the diversification of shareholders’ interests, stimulating the “interest convergence effect” by giving founders a higher degree of control defense, further improving the corporate governance efficiency. (ii) An expansion in board size may reduce corporate governance efficiency, and CEO duality and an increment in independent directors may enhance corporate governance efficiency. (iii) Board structure plays a moderating role in the impact of control defense on corporate governance efficiency. (iv) Within the framework of a dual-class share structure, the increase of equity checks and balances and the long audit tenure may weaken the corporate governance mechanism.