Data for: Can Whistleblower Programs Reduce Tax Evasion? Experimental Evidence

Published: 1 Oct 2019 | Version 1 | DOI: 10.17632/8hjw4nrhgm.1

Description of this data

There are many ways of tackling tax evasion. The traditional strategies implemented by tax authorities fight fiscal fraud through audits and penalties. However, there also exist a plethora of unconventional methods, such as whistleblower programs. Although there is rich economic literature on tax evasion, auditing and penalties, tax agencies’ heavy reliance on whistleblower programs has mostly been ignored. We ran an experiment in which taxpayers can punish tax evaders by reporting them to the authorities, even though it is costly for them to do so and despite the lack of any material benefit from doing so. Information on other taxpayers' compliance rates together with the opportunity to report tax evaders have a positive and very significant effect on the level of income reported. Observing the compliance rates of other participants alone does not suffice to increase tax revenues.

Experiment data files

This data is associated with the following publication:

Can whistleblower programs reduce tax evasion? Experimental evidence

Published in: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics

Latest version

  • Version 1

    2019-10-01

    Published: 2019-10-01

    DOI: 10.17632/8hjw4nrhgm.1

    Cite this dataset

    Masclet, David; Montmarquette, Claude; Viennot-Briot, Nathalie (2019), “Data for: Can Whistleblower Programs Reduce Tax Evasion? Experimental Evidence”, Mendeley Data, v1 http://dx.doi.org/10.17632/8hjw4nrhgm.1

Statistics

Views: 38
Downloads: 5

Categories

Economics

Licence

CC0 1.0 Learn more

The files associated with this dataset are licensed under a Public Domain Dedication licence.

What does this mean?
You can copy, modify, distribute and perform the work, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission.

Report