Trust-game interactions and beliefs in continuous and "All-or-Nothing" investment action spaces.

Published: 21-07-2020| Version 1 | DOI: 10.17632/bg9zfr7zhn.1
Contributors:
Eric Schniter,
Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres,
Timothy Shields

Description

In Gómez-Miñambres, Schniter, & Shields (2020) we conduct two between-subjects experiments to focus our research on “All-or-Nothing” options featured in many trust-based economic interactions. A fundamental issue with restricted investment action spaces is that their imposition may unintentionally affect reciprocity. Drawing from a student sample, we presented participants with an anonymous trust game. In these trust games we manipulate the investor’s action space. In the All-or-Nothing version investors can invest either “all” their endowment or “nothing”. In the other version, they can invest any amount of the endowment. In both versions, the experimenter multiplies the invested amount by three - creating potential gains from trust. Then the trustee receives this and decides how much to reciprocate to the investor. In a second experiment with another student sample we manipulate our description of the “trust game” (i.e. describing either the All-or-Nothing or Continuous version) to investigate effects on beliefs about investor trust and expectations about trustee reciprocity. This data is organized in two files, one for Experiment 1 and one for Experiment 2 described above. Each of these files has (1) a tab with the participants’ economic behavior in the experiment, and (2) a tab with a codebook explaining participants’ data.

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