Data for: When Negotiators with Honest Reputations are Less (and More) Likely to be Deceived

Published: 31 Jan 2020 | Version 1 | DOI: 10.17632/fmx84f94tv.1

Description of this data

The current research examines negotiators’ deception behaviors towards unfamiliar counterparts with varying creditable reputations– specifically, proficient, friendly, and honest reputations. We primarily differentiate between the honest and friendly reputations, which are both seemingly cooperative, and often tangled in the negotiation literature.

We generally hypothesized that Negotiators would deceive counterparts with honest reputations less than those with friendly (or proficient) reputations and that the attenuated deception towards counterparts with honest versus friendly (or proficient) reputations would disappear (or even backfire) in the face of in-congruency – that is, in face of counterparts' deceptive conduct. We also gained further insight into the underlying mechanisms and boundary conditions.

Data was extracted from "Qualtrics". It includes raw data from our negotiation sessions (reported in Studies 1 to 4) including three preliminary studies (A, B, and C). Please note that in Studies 2 and 4, we also had a prior phase - reported in the manuscript as phase 1, which measured various individual differences, including participants' dispositional lying tendencies. Study 2 and Study 4's data files contain the main session variables (Phase 2) plus the individual differences measures collected in Phase 1 (for the same participant).

The actual chat sessions (conducted via "chatplat" in Study 4) are also attached in a txt file extracted from "chatplat" platform, and are in Hebrew.

SPSS data files are attached (for each Study). We added a label for each variable for further clarifications. We also attached SPSS syntax files. These files include comments demonstrating the exact filter condition (Data-> Select Cases) used before any analyses were conducted. We further report the specific SPSS analyses conducted and reported in the manuscript.

Experiment data files

This data is associated with the following publication:

When negotiators with honest reputations are less (and more) likely to be deceived

Published in: Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

Latest version

  • Version 1


    Published: 2020-01-31

    DOI: 10.17632/fmx84f94tv.1

    Cite this dataset

    SimanTov-Nachlieli, Ilanit; Har-Vardi, Liron; Moran, Simone (2020), “Data for: When Negotiators with Honest Reputations are Less (and More) Likely to be Deceived”, Mendeley Data, v1


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Social Psychology, Negotiation Management


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