Data for: Gain versus loss contracts: Does contract framing affect agents' reciprocity?

Published: 31 March 2020| Version 1 | DOI: 10.17632/gpn5db8cz2.1
Contributors:
Frauke von Bieberstein,
Andrea Essl,
Kathrin Friedrich

Description

The data set comes from a lab experiment examining the question whether agents' reciprocity toward the principal is negatively affected by loss contracts. First, agents worked on a real effort task under either a gain or a loss contract. Second, principals and agents played a trust game. We find that loss contracts induce more effort and thus a higher payoff for the principal in the real effort task. In contrast, we do not find a spillover effect of contract framing in the trust game. Differences in reciprocity are small in size and not signifficant. The definition of variables is given by the labels.

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Personnel Economics

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