Inconsistent behaviour and beliefs in a framed ultimatum game: evidence from Khorog, Tajikistan
Description
We are the first to combine harassment bribery and social norms in a laboratory experiment with 296 participants implemented in Khorog (Tajikistan), where bribery (bakshish) is widespread. We investigate the (in)consistency among different aspects of social norms such as actual behavior, empirical expectations, normative expectations, and the conditionality of behaviour upon expectations, using the example of harassment bribery, where "officials" have the possibility to harass a bribe from "citizens" in order to provide a prize they are entitled to. The experiment shows that the vast majority of officials demand bribes and citizens agree to pay them. Empirical expectations of officials about mean bribes are consistent with actual behaviour, however participants underestimate the actual prevalence of corrupt behaviour. On average participants consider that it is socially appropriate to demand and pay relatively small bribes. However, participants consider larger bribe amounts demanded and paid to be less socially appropriate. The experiment provided evidence of contagion, but not conformism effects of harassment behaviour. Our experiment demonstrates that empirical information affects normative expectations, but asymmetrically. Empirical information about the behaviour of officials does not impact the social appropriateness of bribe harassment and bribe acceptance, while empirical information about citizens paying bribes makes harassing and accepting bribes more socially appropriate. The results from this study will help anti-corruption agencies, particularly in identifying which outcomes to publicize in order to improve policy effectiveness.