Politically Optimal Lockdowns with Vaccine Hesitancy: Theory and Evidence from Switzerland (Supplementary Materials)
Description
The .do file and data here will help you replicate the results in the following paper: Politically Optimal Lockdowns with Vaccine Hesitancy: Theory and Evidence from Switzerland Abstract: Are government-imposed restrictions on citizen movement in a pandemic politically optimal? Is there a level of restrictions that a majority will be ready to tolerate? The answers emerge from an extended voter preferences framework, where citizens who live in pandemic conditions choose their vaccination status, and some are vaccine-hesitant. The model demonstrates that a society will be ready to tolerate harder restrictions when its voters are more productive or their vaccine salience is higher. However, the productivity and vaccine salience effects are mitigated by the government's capacity for fiscal transfers. Similar to other political economy models of intra-pandemic societies, zero restrictions emerge as politically optimal in societies with sufficiently high vaccine hesitancy or low productivity. Canton-level evidence from the 2021 Swiss referendum on expanding COVID-19 restrictions offers strong support for the theory. A rich set of policy implications completes the analysis.