Control Defense, Board Structure and Corporate Governance Efficiency under Dual-Class Share Structure——For China Concept Stocks in the US Stock Exchange Markets

Published: 12 September 2024| Version 1 | DOI: 10.17632/s7rhhb3w9v.1
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The data set includes information on the core variables necessary to examine the relationship between control defense, board structure, and corporate governance efficiency. The study sample is primarily composed of China concept stock companies in the US stock exchange markets that are startup in type and homogeneous in culture from 2013 to 2022. Furthermore, it empirically investigates the intrinsic path of the founder control defense on the corporate governance efficiency with a panel data model, with board structure as the moderating role. Moreover, it reveals the roles of equity checks and balances and audit tenure in the governance mechanism of science-technology and innovation-oriented listed companies. The paper finds that: (i) In science-technology and innovation-oriented listed companies under dual-class share structure, the increase in founder control defense contributes to improving corporate governance efficiency. (ii) An increase in board size may reduce corporate governance efficiency, and CEO duality and an increment of the size of independent directors may enhance corporate governance efficiency. (iii) Board structure plays a moderating role in the impact of founder control defense on corporate governance efficiency. (iv) In science-technology and innovation-oriented listed companies, stronger equity control and long audit periods may weaken corporate governance mechanisms.

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Finance, Corporate Finance, Corporate Governance

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