Journal of Development Economics

This is the replication package (data and code) for the paper "Education and Polygamy: Evidence from Cameroon"

Abstract of associated article: In response to concerns over the vulnerability of the young in the wake of Indonesia's 1997–1998 economic crises, the Government of Indonesia implemented a supplementary feeding program to support early childhood nutritional status. This paper exploits heterogeneity in duration of program exposure to evaluate the impact of the program on children aged 6 to 60months. By examining differences in nutritional status of treated younger children and a placebo group of older children, the analysis finds that the program improved the nutritional status of treated children, and most significantly, led to 7 and 15% declines in rates of moderate and severe stunting, respectively, for children aged 12 to 24months who were exposed to the program for at least 12months over two years.

This data set produces all the tables in the paper.

Abstract of associated article: The vast majority of the world's poor live in rural areas of developing countries with little access to financial services. Setting up Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLAs) has become an increasingly widespread intervention aimed at improving local financial intermediation. Using a cluster randomized trial we investigate the impact of VSLAs in Northern Malawi over a two year period. We find evidence of positive and significant intention-to-treat effects on several outcomes, including the number of meals consumed per day, household expenditure as measured by the USAID Poverty Assessment Tool, and the number of rooms in the dwelling. This effect is linked to an increase in savings and credit obtained through the VSLAs, which has increased agricultural investments and income from small businesses.

Replication data for "Testing willingness to pay elicitation mechanisms in the field: evidence from Uganda". The datasets and .do files contained in this folder allow replication of figures and tables present in the paper. Detailed information on how to replicate figures and tables are provided in the document ReadMe.pdf

This dataset combines individual-level data from the 2008 Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey [DHS] (NBS and ICF International, 2008) with data on colonial railroads in Nigeria (Digital Chart of the World, 1992); information on geographic, climatic, and soil conditions from the FAO GAEZ database; and information on distance to primary roads and waterways.

This zip file contains the Stata do files that generate the tables and figures in the paper. Code was written using Stata 14. Open and run "run_all.do" to execute all files in sequence. The associated data is available from the World Bank LSMS-ISA website: http://surveys.worldbank.org/lsms/integrated-surveys-agriculture-ISA

Abstract of associated article: This paper examines whether privatizing state-owned banks improves finance and economic growth. To do so, we exploit regional banking variations in Russia induced by the idiosyncratic creation of “specialized banks” in the last years of the Soviet Union (1988–91) that were subsequently privatized. Starting in 1999 private banks including surviving spetsbanks emerged as an important source of external finance for private firms and households. We document that the regional concentration of spetsbanks in the early years of the Russian federation is orthogonal to economic fundamentals that are related to growth after the emergence of bank finance. Results indicate that while privatized banking increased lending significantly, it did not increase economic growth. However, privatization did increase growth when banks retained fewer political connections and when regional property rights were better protected, highlighting the importance of both factors.

Replication files and data for the paper: "Brothers or Invaders? How Crisis-Driven Migrants Shape Voting Behavior" Authors: Sandra V. Rozo and Juan F. Vargas Journal: Journal of Development Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract of associated article: Informal sectors in developing countries are often thought of as responses to rigid and cumbersome market regulations. In this paper I study informal trade as a first-best outcome. In the model I propose rigid regulations can be necessary to achieve efficiency even though they are always sidestepped. The key assumption is that the regulations define the trading parties' fall-back position in case the informal bargaining process breaks down. I set up a field experiment to test the model's mechanisms in the Cape Town market for metered taxis. Consistent with the model, I find that sidestepping the regulations increase cost efficiency (taxis take the shortest route). The price is however unaffected, suggesting informal bargaining leads to a Pareto improvement.