Does cheating pays off: the evolution and the stability of polymorphic equilibria in a conventional signalling game.

Name: Does cheating pays off: the evolution and the stability of polymorphic equilibria in a conventional signalling game.
Creator: Szabolcs Számadó
Published: 2016-10-01T22:14:51.412Z
Keywords: Natural Sciences, Animal Behavior, Communication, Game Theory

Számadó, Szabolcs

doi:10.17632/fsh992kky2.1

Does cheating pays off: the evolution and the stability of polymorphic equilibria in a conventional signalling game.

Published: 1 October 2016| Version 1 | DOI: 10.17632/fsh992kky2.1

Contributor:

Szabolcs Számadó

Description

The results of computer simulations as specified in the corresponding paper, with regards of evolvability, evolutionary stability and robustness of stability.

Does cheating pays off: the evolution and the stability of polymorphic equilibria in a conventional signalling game.

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