Dataset of deauthentication threat on maritime Wireless Server by Wifi Pineapple Mark 7

Published: 9 September 2026| Version 1 | DOI: 10.17632/nmnk2h3pp6.1
Contributors:
Erasmus Mfodwo, Cihan Varol, Ahmet Furkan Aydogan

Description

This dataset contains data generated when Wi-Fi Pineapple Mark 7 was used to execute a deauthentication attack against NMEA 2000 NavLink2 Wireless Server while AOS Vessel Simulator was parsing live vessel telemetry.

Files

Steps to reproduce

Set up the maritime testbed: Connect the NavLink2 gateway to an NMEA 2000 backbone and ensure a mobile client is actively associated with its Wi‑Fi network. Prepare the WiFi Pineapple Mark VII: Power the device, access the management interface, and enable Recon mode. Perform wireless reconnaissance: Scan for nearby APs, identify the NavLink2 SSID/BSSID, and enumerate associated clients. Execute the deauthentication attack: Use the Pineapple’s Deauth function (MDK4 backend) to target the NavLink2 gateway and its client. Capture handshake artifacts: Allow the Pineapple to automatically collect any WPA2 handshakes generated during client disconnection/reconnection. Delete selected artifacts: Remove chosen .cap handshake files and uninstall the httpeek module to create residual evidence conditions. Acquire management‑interface evidence: Capture screenshots of dashboard, Recon results, logs, modules, and exported JSON scan files. Image permanent storage: Use dd if=/dev/mmcblk0 of=/usb/mk7.img bs=4M conv=fsync to acquire a full bitstream image; compute SHA‑256. Analyze the image in Autopsy: Ingest the image, recover allocated/deleted artifacts (recon.db, log.db, captures, configs, module remnants). Correlate artifacts: Match SSIDs, BSSIDs, MACs, channels, timestamps, and event types across both sources to reconstruct the attack timeline.

Categories

Maritime Ergonomics

Licence